The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

GEORGE WASHINGTON'S STRATEGIC LEADER COMPETENCIES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRIAN F. BOCKLAGE United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20000518 025

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2



USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

GEORGE WASHINGTON'S STRATEGIC LEADER COMPETENCIES

by

Lieutenant Colonel Brian F. Bocklage United States Army

Chaplain (Colonel) Peter K. Christy Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

> DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:

Brian F. Bocklage (LTC), USA

TITLE:

George Washington's Strategic Leader Competencies

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

04 March 2000

PAGES: 25

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This study examines the strategic-leader competencies of George Washington. The competencies discussed include the major categories of conceptual (with its attributes of frame of reference development, problem management, and envisioning the future), technical (systems understanding, joint and combined relationships, and political and social competence) and interpersonal (consensus building, negotiation, communication) as defined in the U.S. Army War College's <u>Strategic Leadership Primer</u>. The scope is limited to General Washington's service during the Revolutionary War. It includes brief biographic information, an explanation of each competency and its attributes and historical examples from General George Washington's life. The author concludes that George Washington exemplified the strategic leader competencies and deserves the title of great strategist.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BSTRACTI	III
EORGE WASHINGTON'S STRATEGIC LEADER COMPETENCIES	1
BIOGRAPHY	1
CONCEPTUAL COMPETENCIES	2
Frame of Reference Development	2
Problem Management	3
Envisioning the Future	5
TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES	5
Systems Understanding	.5
Joint and Combined Relationships	.6
Political and Social Competence	.6
INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCIES	7
Consensus-Building	.7
Negotiation	.8
Communication	.9
NDNOTES	11
IBLIOGRAPHY1	

GEORGE WASHINGTON'S STRATEGIC LEADER COMPETENCIES

The purpose of this paper is to examine the strategic-leader competencies of George Washington. "Competencies are the knowledge skills, attributes, and capacities which enable a leader to perform his required tasks. They may be based on natural ability or may be derived from education, training, or experience." As background, the paper will begin with a short biography. The competencies discussed will include the major categories of conceptual, technical, and interpersonal and their attributes as outlined in chapter five of the U. S. Army War College's <u>Strategic Leadership Primer</u>. Each section will begin with an explanation of the competency or its attributes, then show how Washington exemplified each attribute. As one might expect, many volumes of research material exist on the "Father of our country". The scope of the examination will be limited to some examples of these competencies from the periodicals and books listed in the bibliography. The scope will also be limited to General Washington's service during the Revolutionary War.

George Washington was a great strategic leader. The strengths of his strategic competencies will become evident in the following discussion.

BIOGRAPHY

Washington was born in Virginia on February 23, 1732, the first of his mother's seven children. His father, a widower, already had two sons from his previous marriage. His father died in 1743, when he was eleven. George's schooling was local and brief because of a lack of money – probably less than twelve months of classroom instruction in the elementary grades. When he found books, he educated himself. His stepbrother Lawrence who had been educated in Britain and served briefly in their armed forces, became a father figure. At fourteen he wanted to join the British Navy, but his mother's intervention turned him to surveying.

In 1752, Lawrence died and George Washington was commissioned a major in the Virginia Militia. He served in the French and Indian Wars and became a Lieutenant Colonel at twenty-two. After an initial victory, he was forced to surrender Fort Necessity (near modern Pittsburgh). In 1754, he resigned rather than serve as a Captain in a British force when he felt British officers of the same rank would insist upon being senior to him.

In 1755, Washington served as a volunteer on MG Braddock's staff. Braddock was a British officer in charge of all British and militia forces in America. During the British loss at the Battle of the Wilderness, Washington had four shots through his clothes, and two horses shot from under him. He distinguished himself by reorganizing the broken army and saving the survivors with an orderly withdrawal.

The Governor placed him in command of a regiment of one thousand men to guard the frontier. He spent three years on the border where he survived malaria and dysentery. He participated in a final

expedition against the French in 1758. After years of seeking a commission of field rank in the British army, he was denied again and resigned from the Virginia militia. During four years of service he had shown physical and moral courage, steadfastness in adversity, durability and determination in hardship, ill health and filthy weather. His simple dignity and stern but fair discipline endeared him to his officers and men.²

He retired to a planter's life and married Martha. Her inheritance and Lawrence's will made him one of the wealthiest men in Virginia. Elected to the House of Burgesses in 1765, "he gradually came to be considered one of the outstanding members."

In 1774, Washington was appointed a delegate to the first Continental Congress and, in June 1775, was selected Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. He commanded this Army and after the French Alliance of 1778, the combined French-American forces until December 23, 1783. He held his Army of less than 35,000 men together through many challenges and defeats. The Yorktown Campaign forced British General Comwallis' surrender in 1781 and ultimately ended the war. Washington served two terms as President, in 1789 and 1792, then refused a third term.

He retired to his plantation. The 200th anniversary of this death was recognized on December 14, 1999.

CONCEPTUAL COMPETENCIES

"Strategic conceptual competencies include the thinking skills needed to understand and deal with the complex and ambiguous strategic world." Strategic leaders must understand the second and third order effects to resist actions that may appear reasonable in the short run but are detrimental in the long term. Conceptual competencies include frame of reference development, problem management, and envisioning the future."

Frame of Reference Development.

Leaders build knowledge over time from schooling, experience, and self-study. In order to build a good frame of reference, a leader must be open to new experiences and subordinates' input, reflective and not afraid to rethink and learn from the past, and comfortable with the abstracts of a strategic environment. This reference allows the strategic leader to template events and also provides an understanding of organizational subsystems. By visualizing the interactive dynamics of the total system, leaders avoid indirectly produced, unanticipated adverse impacts.⁷

George Washington constantly built upon his knowledge base. Although he was tutored at home with no formal education, he believed in self-study; and when time was available, he used it to improve his military skills. "Washington learned quickly. He studied the latest manuals, and sought advice from more experienced men. His commitment to improving his knowledge of the profession of arms set the

example for his subordinates." He encouraged his officers to study history to learn from the mistakes of others. He valued the war counsels with his subordinates and sought foreign officers' advice and expertise, despite the objections of many Americans. Baron Fredrich Wilhelm von Steuben was key to retraining his Army and organizing his staff at Valley Forge.

Washington made mistakes, but he always learned from them and never made the same mistake twice. "His battle record reflects the growth of his skill. He progressed from a near disastrous defeat in New York to a minor defeat at Brandywine Creek to a narrow defeat at Germantown to a draw at Monmouth Court House to victory at Yorktown."

Trevor Dupuy adds the following:

"Admittedly, Gen. Washington made tactical mistakes in the Brandywine-Germantown Campaign-so did General Howe; but Howe had professional soldiers to help him to rectify his errors. It is also interesting to note that Gen. Washington never repeated the tactical errors he made and that his future tactics were as sound and professional as was his truly superb strategy." 10

Dave Palmer also observes:

"Washington's one great strategic blunder of the war was his decision to defend the city of New York. Apparently, a combination of political pressure, his own inexperience in high command, and an overly optimistic assessment of the fighting qualities of his green troops led him to taking a stand there. New York City was a trap. Americans had no fleet at all, while the waters surrounding Manhattan Island were choked with hostile sail...Washington's superb evacuation from Long Island saved his Army from destruction and the experience provided him an "education in generalship...Never again after New York did he hand Howe or his successors such a golden opportunity to destroy the American Army outright; never again did he need more than a fair share of luck to survive."

He also successfully dealt with the unknowns of French intervention, British reactions, and the developing political system of the new American government. "The crucial military difference (apart from levels of innate ability) between Washington and the commanders who opposed him was that they were sure they knew all the answers, while Washington tried every day and every hour to learn."

Problem Management.

Strategic problems involve competing issues, complex implications and potentially catastrophic outcomes. Leaders must apply past experiences, identify patterns, discard non-usable data, understand second and third order effects, maintain flexibility, and focus on system outcomes. Interactive management replaces piecemeal problem solving. Committing to decisions, operating effectively under conditions of uncertainty and acceptance of risk is essential.¹³

Washington understood the competing issues and complexity of the French involvement and resolved them carefully. The French forces were crucial to victory. Congress initially wanted to employ them in an invasion of Canada. Washington understood the possible second and third order effects of French territorial expansion if they returned to Canada. Washington wrote, "The mere thought alarms all

my feelings for the true and permanent interests of my country." He was looking into the future. With Frenchmen in Canada, Spaniards in New Orleans, and Indians along the western frontier, Paris would "have it in her power to give law to these states." Unsure of being persuasive enough by letter, the general went to Philadelphia in December to argue personally. He convinced Congress that the invasion would interfere with their goal of expansion of the colonies and the offensive was cancelled.

Early in the war, he used his advantage of interior lines and positioned his Army to maintain flexibility. It was his only counter to British numerical superiority and sea-borne mobility. No one explained it better than Washington himself.¹⁵

"Should the enemy's design be to penetrate the country up the Hudson River, we are well posted to oppose them; should they attempt to penetrate into New England, we are well stationed to cover them; if they move westward we can easily (intercept them); and besides, it will oblige the enemy to leave a much stronger garrison at New York."

Throughout the war he remained flexible and tailored his actions and strategy to fit the changing situations of four different British strategies, British reinforcement from England, world opinion and French intervention.

"First, he attacked at every conceivable turn, taking the strategic offensive to the full extent of his powers. Beating the enemy was of primary importance. Then, in the second phase, he turned cautious, not refusing battle, but fighting with his wagons facing the rear. His strategic defense was designed to defend the Untied States, to be sure, but primarily its purpose was to avoid a decisive defeat. Next, in conjunction with French allies, he returned to the foremost aim of inflicting military defeat on his foe. His strategic offensive, though greatly prolonged because of problems inherent in cooperating with a foreign fleet operating from a base thousands of miles away, resulted finally in victory at Yorktown. After that, with independence all but won, he shifted his strategic offensive toward achieving he aim of expanding national borders. But once again avoiding defeat became more important than gaining victory. For the most part, the military weakness of a small nation tired of war frustrated his efforts in this final phase, though by keeping an army together and exerting constant visible pressure on the enemy he helped assure a favorable settlement."

When Washington could not overcome French concerns about attacking New York City, he immediately developed the alternative of seizing Yorktown. He maintained flexibility by positioning his Army for either action until he obtained a written commitment from the French Navy.

"Nevertheless, Washington had no intention of leaving himself at the mercy of the whims or fears of the admiral of the French fleet. He carefully wrote out a series of questions for the commander of the foreign armada...when Washington and Rochambeau met de Grasse for the first time, the American leader politely but pointedly handed over his list. The Frenchman promptly answered each query in writing. He committed himself to stay...Satisfied that he would not be deserted, Washington initiated the investment of Yorktown."

He accepted risk by splitting his Army, committed to an alternative path, and ultimately won the decisive victory of the war at Yorktown.

Envisioning the Future.

The strategic leader must envision the future; understand the interaction of ends, ways, and means; and think creatively outside of established boundaries to formulate and articulate strategic aims. He must also act proactively to shape the future environment to facilitate success. ¹⁹

Washington understood and never wavered from his vision of a country free of British control and prepared for territorial expansion. "Washington was not always successful in the affairs of the moment, but his objective was always the ultimate one, and regardless of the course adopted he aimed at arriving at the final goal set for himself." He was able to see beyond the established system of reliance on state militias and understood the importance of a standing, professional Army for shaping the future, enhancing goals and achieving that vision. He felt it was a critical symbol that demonstrated the power and legitimacy of the American cause. "The researcher scratches in vain for a single instance in all the years of the war when Washington ever lost sight of the objectives for which he was fighting. From first to last, he never added to or subtracted from the vision of a United States free of Europe and supreme in North America. Achieving that was victory. In those terms, and those alone, he unfalteringly devised his strategy."

William Odom observed:

"Psychologically, the national Army served as a symbol of American unity. Its mere existence as a whole, identifiable body kept the cause alive, and this dimensions of the conflict was even more important than battlefield victory. Washington was infinitely less afraid of military defeat than of doubt and disunity within the patriot cause. Ultimately, however, battle would decide the issue, and Washington believed that only a professional force could ensure victory. He dismissed popular preferences for reliance on militia on the basis of extensive personal experiences."

TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES

"At the strategic level, technical competencies include an understanding of functional relationships outside the organization, and knowledge of the broader political and social systems within which the organization operates." Attributes include systems understanding, joint and combined relationships, and political and social competence.

Systems Understanding.

The strategic leader must concentrate on how the organization fits within the broader national framework and international arena that are characterized by complex and numerous reporting and coordinating interrelationships. Leaders must understand their roles, boundaries, demands, constraints and expectations.²⁴

Although the American system of government was still evolving, Washington was a former member of both Congress and the Virginia Legislature. He worked with the British Army as a volunteer aide and

commander in the Virginia Militia during the French and Indian War. He understood the political and military systems of the day. He frequently consulted Congress face to face and maintained civilian control of the military. He maximized the effectiveness of the militia by using them in their local areas. Although the budget constrained the size of the professional Army, he increased its effectiveness by training and reorganization, and successfully lobbied Congress to fund some growth.

"His methodical and energetic approach to the administration of the army was also critical to its success. Indeed, most of Washington's work consisted of attending meetings and writing. Although not a polished communicator he expressed himself clearly, logically, concisely, and frequently, as evidenced by the 25 volumes of his wartime correspondence. On balance, Washington's administrative performance contributed more to achieving his vision than his actions in battle. In this role, he truly created the conditions for success by skillfully managing the resources required to attain victory."

A quote from one of his letters to the Continental Congress during Valley Forge illustrates the magnitude of his success: "Unless one great and capital change suddenly takes place in that line, this army must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three things – starve-dissolve-or disperse, in order to obtain subsistence."

Joint and Combined Relationships.

Different nations and different services have their own cultures and operating practices. Strategic leaders operate effectively in a multicultural environment to gain the full understanding and commitment of their subordinates.²⁷

Washington appreciated the interrelationship of land and sea power in his defense of the coastal heartland of America. Whenever major British ground forces became isolated from British sea power, "General Washington who understood the importance and significance of sea power better than any of his British opponents, promptly took advantage... snatching the preferred initiative away from the British." Washington understood the importance of the French Navy. He developed an effective relationship with the French. He understood their goals, met personally with their leaders and when oral agreements did not work, he tactfully secured written commitments. He successfully employed this Navy and won at Yorktown. "Washington's undoubted success with the land and sea forces of France, so well illustrated in the campaign culminating at Yorktown, can be attributed to his wisdom and sagacity, to the power and greatness of his character and personality, to his perfect understanding of the problem, and to his courtesy and tact."

Political and Social Competence.

The ability to work with the executive branch agency and the legislative branch to develop policy, prepare strategy and secure resources is fundamental for strategic leaders. They must also understand the social culture and the values within their organization.³⁰ Washington constantly worked with the legislative branch to develop strategy and resource the Army. He met with and wrote to Congress on a

frequent basis. He successfully adjusted the strategy from the offensive to the defensive four times during the war and maintained legislative support. As discussed earlier, he was successful in averting a Congressional plan for a combined French invasion of Canada, when it conflicted with his country's long term goals.

George Washington was the standard bearer, and developed the culture and values of the Army. "He ate his afternoon meal with the officers of the day as a means of keeping in touch with junior officers." He was the constant example and enforcer of discipline, justice, devotion to duty, and courage. In eight years of war, he only left his Army for two brief visits to his home in Mount Vernon. "He constantly lived with the army in the field, believing that to share a common lot and participate in inconveniences...(was to him) a fundamental principle."

"As the standard-bearer for the American Army, Washington personified the qualities he sought in the envisioned organization: strong, devoted, hard-working, courageous, skilled, virtuous and most important, possessing the indomitable will to win. These attributes, more than any other aspect of Washington's leadership, carried the American Army through to the achievement of his vision. One historian aptly summarized: When all other sources of inspiration failed, the army's bravery and determination were sustained by his example."

Another historian observed:

"Washington frequently appealed to the soldiers' higher senses of duty, honor and country, but never lost sight of the primacy of self-interest and survival in humans. First among these requirements was adequate care for the soldiers. At Boston, his top priority was to improve the health, supply system and wages of the soldiers. These problems were so significant during the war that at one point, Washington pulled his most competent field commander, Nathaniel Greene, out of the line to take charge of the quartermaster function."

INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCIES

"Strategic-leader interpersonal competencies include the ability to build consensus within the organization, the ability to negotiate with external agencies or organizations in an attempt to shape or influence the external environment, and the ability to communicate internally and externally."

Consensus-Building.

Strategic leaders must deal with outside organizations and leaders of other services or nations. They must persuade, compromise, and work with peers to gain consensus and commitment to long-term goals. 36

Washington effectively used war councils to build consensus among his key leaders. He would ask for input to specific questions in advance, meet and then discuss their answers. He often asked them to vote on courses of action. If support were lacking he would develop the situation and gather more intelligence then meet again, to build a consensus.

"The hindsight of the historian can only reinforce Washington's conviction that the crucial battles of the war were in the arenas of public opinion. There can be no doubt that the British were totally outclassed in the warfare for the minds of men. It was in those mental arenas that the civilian-soldier George Washington shone the brightest. He kept forever in mind, as more radical statesmen of either the right or the left could not do, that the fundamental objective was not to foster division but to increase unity." ³⁷

Negotiation.

Strategic leaders must rely on negotiating skills for lateral relationships without clear subordination. Skills include standing firm on non-negotiable points, communicating respect, listening, diagnosing unspoken agendas, detaching from the process, and conveying a willingness to compromise.³⁸

"Washington frequently consulted his officer's and carefully considering their views before making important decisions, Washington built commitment and a sense of sharing in the Army." 39

Washington also used consensus building and negotiation with the French. He understood that the French were really peers and not subordinates. Washington came away from his first conference with the French General Rochambeau, "Understanding that Rochambeau's loudly proclaimed subordination to him was so much window dressing, that it would apply only when French ends were served. He noted wryly, My command of the French troops stands upon a very limited scale." He also realized that their unspoken agenda was engaging the British fleet. Washington was willing to listen, develop respect and compromise from a New York to a Yorktown objective.

After Comwallis' surrender at Yorktown, London agreed to begin negotiations. Washington understood the Army was key to America's bargaining position. His greatest fear is that Congress, viewing this stroke (Yorktown) in too important a point of light, may think our work too nearly closed and will fall into a state of languor and relaxation. He met with Congress and convinced them to preserve the Army. He continued to campaign for almost two years until treaties were signed in December 1783. Dave Palmer's insights show that Washington understood negotiations and the importance of shaping the peace:

"Euphoria swept the country after Yorktown, and it took all the General's powers just to keep his army intact through the extended negotiations. The struggle had seemed interminable long. The citizenry was tired and the soldiers wanted to go home. The British could not have won the war at that late date, but the Americans could have forfeited their victory – which they indeed verged on doing. Some say Washington's greatest achievement was preventing a collapse of national will and resolve during those last trying years...The final peace treaties were favorable to the United States, largely because American negotiators had always bargained from a position of strength – strength whose continued maintenance was largely attributable to the vision and will of George Washington."

Communication

Internal communications through either direct or indirect means are always carefully analyzed. Care in choice of words and sensitivity to nuances of meaning are essential to ensuring the desired message is received. Strategic leaders also communicate externally for the organization. Clarity of though, direction, and process coupled with persuasiveness and brevity are essential to successful consensus building and negotiation.⁴⁴

If Washington had a weakness among the strategic leader competencies, he felt it was in written and oral communication. Historians would disagree. He may not have been as dynamic or emotional as he wanted to be, but he was an effective communicator. He wrote to his subordinates often and always carefully analyzed his oral and written words. After victories at Trenton and Princeton "reinstilled the Army with a sense of purpose and pride, Washington added to the momentum by personally appearing before each regiment to praise their performance and renew their commitment to the cause." He worked hard, stayed organized, and personally wrote his directives. "He required the services of seven aides to keep up with his extraordinary workload." He made frequent personal visits to his subordinates, took charge when necessary and led from the front. At the Battle of Monmouth, General Lee was the vanguard of the Army. When he used poor tactical leadership and retreats, Washington relieved and arrested him for cowardliness, took control of his forces and turned the battle into an American victory. ⁴⁷

"His courage inspired his troops. Many diaries and letters of Revolutionary War soldiers cite Washington's conspicuous bravery under fire and cool resourcefulness in desperate situations. At Harlem Heights, Princeton, Germantown and Monmouth Court House, he was, perhaps recklessly, in the thick of the fighting. At Princeton, he rode to within 30 yards of the British line to rally American soldiers who had broken before British bayonet charges. By all accounts, his personal combat leadership had a profound impact on the performance of his army. Throughout the war, he led from the front. As late as the final battle at Yorktown, he dug a portion of the trench works and fired the first cannon."

His personal example of sacrificing with his soldiers and constantly demonstrating the dedication and devotion to the nation indirectly provided clarity of direction to his Army. He was persuasive and never altered his vision.

He brought a nearly rebellious and unpaid Army back to their senses at Newburgh, New York with a few words and a simple physical demonstration of his sacrifice for his country:

"...With no show of anger or offended dignity, but very gravely, with a sort of majesty it moved one strangely to see, and taking a written paper from his pocket, adjusted his spectacles to read it. "Gentlemen," he said, very simply, "you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray, but almost blind, in the service of my country." There were wet eyes upon the instant in the room; no man stirred while he read—read words of admonition, of counsel, and of hope which burned at the ear; and when he was done, and had withdrawn, leaving them to do what they would, they did nothing of which he could be ashamed."

When he farewelled his officers at the war's end, grown men cried and embraced.

"Washington said simply: With a heart full of love and gratitude, I now take leave of you. I most devoutly wish that your later days may be as prosperous and happy as your former

ones have been glorious and honorable. Washington's emotions were so high that tears were blinding him. He said, "I cannot come to each of you, but shall feel obligated if each of you will come and take me by the hand." Gen. Henry Knox, the senior present, stepped forward and held out his hand. Washington extended his own, but when he remembered how much Knox meant to him, he could not say farewell with a handshake. Impulsively, he put his arm around him and kissed him. Once having done this, he had, of course, to give others the same. When the last weeping officer had received his embrace, Washington turned, walked to the door, and raised his arm in an all-inclusive farewell, then walked through the door."

The author has to conclude that George Washington was an effective communicator.

In conclusion, the study of George Washington exemplifies the strategic leader competencies. He possessed the conceptual, technical, and interpersonal skills required of a strategic leader. This paper has provided some brief examples of his strengths. Research did not uncover any weaknesses. George Washington was a competent, flexible leader, who understood his complex environment, focused on long term outcomes and maintained his values, focus, and vision. He has passed the historical examinations and deserves the title of great strategist. Dave R. Palmer sums it up best, "Washington's place in history is secure . . And that he possessed unusual strategic grasp can hardly be doubted. Indeed, even before the word strategy was coined, George Washington had become this nation's first strategist – and perhaps one of its best." 51

Trevor Dupuy adds:

"George Washington was by far the most able military leader, strategically and tactically, on either side of the Revolution. He started the war in 1775 as an inexperienced commander, well aware of his own deficiencies. By 1781 he had developed a competence worthy of favorable comparison with Alexander the Granicus, Caesar at the Rubicon, Hannibal at the Alps, Genghis Khan at the Great Wall, Frederick the Great at Prague, or Napoleon at Montenotte."

WORD COUNT = 4647

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Rodereick R. Magee and Brehon Burke Somervell, eds., <u>Strategic Leadership Primer</u> (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, 1998), 37.
 - ² Robert Leckie, George Washington's War (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 141
 - ³ Ibid., 142.
 - ⁴ Magee and Somervell, 37.
 - ⁵ Ibid., 37.
 - ⁶ Ibid., 38.
 - ⁷ lbid., 38-39.
- ⁸ William O. Odom, "The Rudder in the Storm: George Washington as Senior Leader," <u>Military</u> Review 4, no.1 (1974): 64
 - 9lbid.
 - ¹⁰ Trevor N. Dupuy, "Washington as a General," <u>Army</u> 25, (June 1975): 45.
 - ¹¹ Dave R. Palmer, "General Washington: Grand Strategist or Mere Fabian?" Parameter 4, 8-9
 - ¹² Magee and Somervell, 41.
 - ¹³ Ibid., 39-40.
 - ¹⁴ Dave R. Palmer, <u>The Way of the Fox</u> (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 156.
 - ¹⁵ Dupuy, 46.
 - ¹⁶ Palmer, "General George Washington: Grand Strategist or Mere Fabian?", 11.
 - ¹⁷ Ibid., 15-16.
 - ¹⁸ Palmer, "The Way of the Fox", 177.
 - ¹⁹ Magee and Somervell, 40.
- ²⁰ Paul M. Robinett, "General George Washington and Leadership," <u>Armor</u> 69 (January-February 1960): 27.
 - ²¹ Magee and Somervell, 40.
 - ²² Odom, 59.

:	²³ Magee and Somervell, 41.
:	²⁴ Ibid.
;	²⁵ Odom, 66.
,	²⁶ Ivan Birrer, "The Private Life of George Washington," Military Review 32, no. 2 (May 1952): 112.
:	Magee and Somervell, 41.
:	²⁸ Dupuy, 4 5.
:	²⁹ Robinett, 28.
:	³⁰ Magee and Somervell, 42.
;	³¹ Odom, 65.
:	³² Ibid., 64 .
:	³³ Ibid., 65.
:	³⁴ Odom, 62.
	³⁵ Magee and Somervell, 42.
:	³⁶ Ibid.
	³⁷ Ibid., 4 3.
•	³⁸ lbid.
	³⁹ Odom, 65,
•	⁴⁰ Dave R. Palmer, <u>The Way of the Fox</u> , 167-168.
•	⁴¹ Palmer, "General George Washington: Grand Strategist or mere Fabian?", 14.
(Carl	⁴² Sheila C. Toner, <u>George Washington America's First Strategic Leader</u> , Strategy Research Project, isle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 Apr 1996): 13
	⁴³ Palmer, 15.
	⁴⁴ Magee and Somervell, 43.
•	⁴⁵ Odom, 60.
•	⁴⁶ Ibid., 64 .

⁴⁷ Toner, 10.

⁴⁸ Odom, 64.

⁴⁹ Woodrow Wilson, <u>George Washington</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1903), 223.

⁵⁰ B. Dean Smith, "Truly This Was America's Greatest Leader!", <u>Officer Review</u> 39, no. 5 (December 1999): 8,

⁵¹ Palmer, "General George Washington: Grand Strategist or Mere Fabian?", 16.

⁵² Dupuy, 46.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andresen, Martin W., "The American Revolution The Militia Experience." Lecture, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, 19 January 2000.
- Bancroft, Aaron. <u>The life of George Washington: Commander-in-Chief of the American Army Through the Revolutionary War, and the First President of the United States</u>. Philadelphia: Porter and Coates, 1880.
- Birrer, Ivan J. Review of <u>The Private Life of George Washington</u>, by Francis R. Bellamy. <u>Military Review</u> 32, no. 2(May 1952): 112.
- Bruce-Briggs, B. "Showdown at Newburgh." ARMY 34, (July 1984): 58-61.
- Cragg, Dan. <u>General's in Muddy Boots, A Concise Encyclopedia of Combat Commanders</u>. New York: The Berkley Publishing Group. 1996.
- Davis, Edwin S. "The Religion of George Washington: A Bicentennial Report." <u>Air University Review</u> 27, (July-August 1976): 30-34.
- Davenport, Dale A. "Washington Remains Central Figure." <u>The Harrisburg Patriot News</u>, 14 December 1999, sec. A, p. 14.
- Deerin, James B. "Washington Builds an Army." National Guardsman 30, (January 1976): 6-9.
- Dupuy, Trevor N. "Washington as General." Army 25, (June 1975): 41-46.
- Elazar, Daniel J. and Ellis Katz, eds. <u>American Models of Revolutionary Leadership, George Washington and other Founders.</u> Lanham, MD: University of America Press, Inc. 1992.
- Falk, Stanley L. "George Washington's National Security Council." <u>Military Review</u> 51, (July 1971): 23-27.

Fast, Howard, screenwriter, <u>The Crossing,</u> Arts and Entertainment Channel, 2000, Television.
Fetner, Jack. "The Last Days of George Washington." Officer Review 39,no. 5(December 1999): 4-6.
. "George Washington, the Early Years." Officer Review 39, no. 5(December 1999): 7.
Fitzpatrick, John C. <u>George Washington: Colonial Traveller</u> . Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1927.
Flexner, James T. <u>Washington, The Indispensable Man</u> . Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. <u>George Washington</u> . New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968.
. <u>George Washington, A Biography, Volume One, Young Washington</u> . New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948.
. George Washington, A Biography, Volume Six, Patriot and President. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954.
Greenleaf, Robert K., <u>Seeker and Servant,</u> eds. Anne T. Fraker and Larry C. Spears, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 1996.
Hayes, John D. "Washington and the Sea." <u>Military Review</u> 51, (July 1971): 60-66.
Higginbotham, Don. "What Today's Army Officers Can Learn From George Washington." American Heritage 34, (February-March 1983): 104-105.
. "The Vietnamization of the American Revolution." <u>American Heritage</u> 34, (February-March 1983): 79-80.

Hill, Watt G. "Mr. Washington Goes to Philadelphia." Officer Review 39, no. 5 (December 1999): 9-10.

Kleber, Brooks E. "The Story Behind a Promotion: Washington Is Now No. 1." Army 28, (June 1978): 14-15. LaFay, Howard. "Man Behind the Myths." National Geographic 150, (July 1976): 90-110. Leckie, Robert. George Washington's War. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. Lorence, Walter E. "To Command Only To Serve." Army 11, (February 1961): 62-63. Lykke, Arthur F., Jr. ed. Military Strategists: Past and Present: A Reference Text for the U.S. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College. 1994. Lykke, Arthur F., Jr. ed. Military Strategy: Theory and Application. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College. 1993. Magee, Dr. Roderick R. II, and General Brehon Burke Somervell, eds. Strategic Leadership Primer. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, 1998. Maginnis, Robert L. "Character and Leadership." Infantry 77, (September-October 1987): 9-13. Miller, William P. "Victory by Precise Plan." Military History 8, (February 1992): 42-49. Odum, William O. "The Rudder in the Storm: George Washington as Senior Leader." Military Review 2, (June 1992): 54-66. Palmer, Dave R. "General George Washington: Grand Strategist or Mere Fabian?" Parameters 4, no.1 (1974): 1-16. The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775-1783. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975.

Palmer, John McAuley. <u>Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen</u>. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1930.

Pickard, Allen H. "Tell General Sullivan to Use the Bayonet." Airman 6, (July 1962): 44-48.

Prescott, Jean. "Film provides Insight on George Washington." <u>The Harrisburg Patriot News</u>, 10 January 2000, sec. D, p. 2.

Rigg, Robert B. "Of Spies and Specie." Military Review 42, (August 1962): 13-21.

Riley, Don T. "Serve Your Soldiers to Win." Military Review 66, (November 1986): 10-19.

Robinett, Paul M. "General Washington and Leadership." Armor 69, (January-February 1960): 26-28.

Siegfried, David C. "George Washington-Colonel of Militia." National Guardsman 14, (August 1960): 11.

Skaggs, David C. "Then Generalship of George Washington." Military Review 54, (July 1974): 3-10.

Smith, B. D. "Truly This Was America's Greatest Leader!" Officer Review 39, no. 5 (December 1999): 8.

Spears, Larry C., ed. Reflections on Leadership: <u>How Robert K. Greenleaf's Theory of Servant Leadership Influenced Today's Top Management Thinkers</u>. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995.

Stevens, Peter F. "Early Disinformation Campaign: George Washington Was Master of Deception Employed Against the British." Military History 9, (June 1992): 12+.

<u>The Re-enactment of the Funeral of George Washington</u>, "American Presidents". CSPAN, 22 December 1999.

Turabian, Kate L. <u>Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations</u>. Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1996.

Toner, Sheila C. <u>George Washington: America's First Strategic Leader</u>. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 Apr 1996.

Warren, Jack, Washington Journal. C-SPAN television channel, 22 Dec 2000.

Wilbur, William H. The Making of George Washington. Deland, FI: Patriotic Education, Inc., 1973.

Wilson, Woodrow. George Washington. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1903.

Wren, J. Thomas, ed. <u>The Leader's Companion: Insights on Leadership Through the Ages</u>. New York: Free Press, 1995.